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 Inherent safety is an approach that is aim to minimize or eliminate the main 
causes of the hazards by adjusting the design of the chemical process plant instead of 
depending on the existing safety systems of the equipment and procedure of the 
process.  Even though the present facilities and operating procedures has provided 
the safety engineered system and cost performance, the actual implementation of 
inherent safety in process design stage has not been commonly implemented in the 
industries. Current research and development are mainly specifically for explosion 
and fire cases only. None of these methods were developed to reduce or prevent the 
major accidents due to toxic release accidents. Therefore, this paper proposes a new 
technique to evaluate the level of inherent safety of process plant during the 
preliminary design stage by using the combined assessment of process routes, 
streams and inherent risk for toxic release accidents. This technique is known as 3-
Tier Inherent Safety quantification (3-TISQ). The 3-TISQ technique is able to 
quantify and prioritize the level of inherent safety of the process route and stream, 
determine the inherent risk and modify the design up to acceptable level during the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of Study 
 The chemical process industry evolution can be related with the advances of 
technology. This can be proven by looking at the chemical industry itself, where it is 
now moving on to more complex processes and requires more complex safety 
technology to prevent major accidents in chemical plants. Major accident have been 
defined as ‘an unexpected, sudden occurrence such as major emission, fire or 
explosion resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of 
any establishment and leading to serious danger to human health and/or the 
environment, immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment and 
involving one or more dangerous substance’ [1]. A survey of the type of hardware 
that caused massive accidents of chemical plants is shown in Figure 1. Piping system 
failure represents the bulk of accidents, followed by storage tanks and reactors. From 
the survey, it is clearly presented that the most complicated mechanical components 
such as pumps and compressors are minimally responsible for large losses [1]. 
 
Figure 1: Hardware that associated with massive chemical accidents [1] 
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 The three most cited major accidents (Flixborough, Seveso and Bhopal) are 
identified here. All these accidents had a momentous impact on public’s perception 
and the chemical engineering profession that added new significance and standards 
in the safety practice [1].  
1) Flixborough, England (June 1974) 
The leakage and explosion of cyclohexane has caused 28 of workers deaths 
and 36 suffered injuries. 
  
2) Seveso, Italy (July 1976) 
An explosion of TCDD (2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin) was released 
and over 600 people were evacuated and about 100,000 animals were killed. 
 
3) Bhopal, India (December 1984) 
Estimated 25 tons of extremely toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC) vapor was 
released killing over 2,000 people and more 20,000 were injured.  
 Based on the previous major accidents, most of the chemical plants started 
with minor flaws such as instruments out of order, poor procedure practice, and 
failure to follow the procedures or good engineering practices. Therefore, to 
minimize or eliminate (if possible) potential accidents in chemical process plant, any 
changes such as selecting less hazardous chemical used for the process, can be made 
earlier before starting any operation. However, according to Kletz [2], history shows 
that accidents were repeated after a lapse of a few years, and lessons are forgotten as 







1.2 Problem Statement 
 Previously, the methodologies for inherent safety level (ISL) quantification 
index based are mainly on process route only. Not only that, mostly earlier work 
done for index based inherently safer design (ISD) approach focusing on chemical 
route by using properties of single element. There are also lacking in considering the 
chemical components as a mixture and developed purposely for toxic release.  
 Once the best route is selected, the inherently safer design (ISD) can be 
implemented by improving the inherent safety level (ISL) of the streams. The ISD 
can be done by ranking the process streams based on ISL within a process route. By 
using this ISL of the process streams ranking method, the most hazardous streams 
can be selected. However, this concept has never been addressed for toxic release of 
the process streams.  
 After the worst stream has been ranked, the ISD can be done at preliminary 
design stage by assessing inherent risk of selected stream within a process route. One 
of the suitable techniques for assessing ISL in process industries is based on 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). Although QRA has been widely used in 
industries, but QRA has not been used at the preliminary design stage yet and to be 










1.3 Objectives   
The main objective of the research is: 
1. To develop, an inherently safer design technique for process plant using the 
following approaches: 
 
i. Process route index for toxic release 
ii. Process stream index for toxic release 
iii. Inherent risk assessment based on risk matrix for toxic release 
 
1.4 Scope of Study  
 The scope of study for this project will be covering three main tasks. The first 
task is to screen the process routes and to select the ‘best’ route that is inherently less 
dangerous. As for the second task, ISL of the streams within the selected process 
route will be identified and prioritized. For example, the streams that have low or 
absent of hazards can be identified and eliminated. After the worst stream is given by 
the highest level ISL value, the selected streams can be determined using inherent 
risk assessment which is similar to Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to evaluate 












CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction   
 Chemical plants comprise varieties of hazards. As the development of 
chemical, oil and petrochemical industries since 1960s are increasing; the number of 
major accidents also increases, generally due to loss of containment which 
containing reactive and hazardous chemicals and this has resulting in the form of fire, 
explosion  or toxic release. During an accident in a process plant, toxic and 
hazardous materials can be release at a very fast rate and spread in the form of 
dangerous clouds. Referring to the past accidents that already been discussed in 
section 1.1, chemical engineers will need a more detailed and deeper understanding 
of process safety as such it should be evaluated and addressed in the whole lifecycle 
of a process system or a facility [3]. Therefore, hazard analysis needs to be carried 
out starting from research and development until decommissioning. In the next 
section, a few methods of hazards analysis will be reviewed.  
2.2 Hazard Analysis in Process Plant Lifecycle Stages 
 There are few methods that have been practiced in industries for hazard 
analysis. The methods are:    
2.2.1 DOW Fire and Explosion Index (DOW F&EI)   
 DOW F&EI is first issued by the DOW Chemical Co. in 1964 [4] and 
currently has become one of the most common hazard identification procedures. The 
DOW F&EI has a systematic approach to measure the potential risk from a process 
and calculating estimate potential loss of an accident [5]. This method is designed for 
rating the relative hazards with the storage, handling and processing of explosive and 
flammable materials, free from individual judgment factors. It is worthwhile 
estimating the DOW FEI index at an early stage in the process design, as it will 
indicate whether alternative, less hazardous process routes should be considered.   
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 The first step of calculating DOW F&EI is to determine the units that would 
have the highest likelihood of a hazard. Next is to determine the material factor (MF) 
which it acts as a measure of the intrinsic rate of energy release from the burning, 
explosion or other chemical reaction of the material. Generally, the more flammable 
and/or explosive of material have the higher value of MF. Referring to Equation 2.1 
is the calculation of The Process Unit Hazards Factor (F3) where it is the 
multiplication of General Process Hazard Factor (F1) and Special Process Hazard 
Factor (F2).  
                                                   𝐹3 = 𝐹1 × 𝐹2                                                     Eq. 2.1 
Therefore, the DOW F&EI is now can be estimated by multiplying the MF and 
Process Unit Hazards Factor as shown in Equation 2.2. 
                                       𝐹 & 𝐸𝐼 = 𝑀𝐹 × 𝐹3                                                     Eq. 2.2 
Table 1: Level of hazard and DOW Fire and Explosion Index [1] 
DOW F&EI Degree of Hazard 
1 – 60 Light 
61 – 96 Moderate 
97 – 127 Intermediate 
128 – 158 Heavy 
159 and above Severe 
 
2.2.2 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) 
 Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) study has been used for 
identifying potential hazards and operability problems caused by deviations from 
design or operating intentions [6]. Basically, HAZOP is a method that assumes that a 
system or component is safe by having all the operating parameters at acceptable 
levels. HAZOP is carried out to search hazards in the form of deviations from the 
norm with possible dangerous consequences. To identify deviations, the study team 
7 
 
is facilitated by using sets of guidewords to determine possible causes and note any 
prevention ways of the consequences to recommend action. The HAZOP team needs 
to go through the entire process flow diagrams (PFD) and piping and instrumentation 
diagrams (PID) to examine and identify deviations. Basically, the parameters studied 
will include basic process conditions like temperature, pressure and flow. As stated 
in HSE-UK [7], this approach can be described as a brainstorming technique because 
it helps stimulate the imagination of team members when determining potential 
deviations and finding ways to evaluate significances.         
2.2.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is most commonly used in the process 
industries to quantify the risks of ‘major hazards’. QRA used in the offshore oil and 
gas industries, the transport of hazardous materials, the protection of the environment, 
mass transportation (rail) and the nuclear industry [7]. Typically, QRA acts as a 
formal and systematic approach of recognizing potentially hazardous events, 
assessing the likelihood and consequences of those events and expressing the results 
as risk to people, the environment or the business. However, in order to avoid 
numerous hazards, to estimate the likelihood of the past accident or incident data, 
several selections need to be taken care such as, the accident/incident sample, the 
time period and the statistical method [8]. Shell International Exploration and 
Production B.V.  [9] stated that the application of QRA is not necessarily bounded to 
huge, complex and costly studies. It can be classify as a quick and cheap technique to 
assist to figure out the solution to problems for which the solution is not intuitively 
obvious.  
 Risk is once proposed as a mathematical function (Equation 2.3) as follows 
according to Wentz [10]:   




In addition, risk is frequently defined as a function of the chance that a specified 
undesired event will occur and the severity of the consequences of the event [9]. As 
for QRA, chance stated above can be expressed as probability or frequency of an 
occurrence similar to the Equation 2.3.  
2.3 Inherent Safety Application in Plant Design  
 The application of inherent safety in process design has been recognized as a 
better method to have a safe process plant, without or with minimum damage to the 
environment and health. Literally, inherent safety purposes to minimize or eliminate 
the main causes of the hazards by modifying the design during preliminary stage 
such as the hardware, controls and the operating conditions of the process instead of 
depending on additional and available engineered safety systems. According to 
Ashford et al. [11], inherent safety sometimes also referred as “primary prevention” 
which depends on the development and formation of inherently safe technologies 
that avoid any possibilities of an accident. Secondary prevention is to reduce 
probability of an accident. As to compare between primary and secondary prevention 
[12], “secondary prevention” pursue mitigation and emergency responses to decrease 
the seriousness of injuries, property and environmental damage due to chemical 
accidents. Ashford and Zwetsloot [12] have proven that inherently safer options are 
also economically and technically feasible for plant operations. Although inherent 
safety is a flexible concept that can be applied at any design or operating stage, its 
involvement at the earliest stage of designing a process especially during the process 
route and selecting equipment will produces the best results with respect to time, 
production, quality and cost. In addition, inherent safety also should considered to be 
applied to operating existing plant as an alternative to provide significant 
improvement.   
2.4 Previous Methodologies for Quantification of Inherent Safety Level (ISL) 
 A number of researchers have proposed numerous methodologies for inherent 
safety level quantification. Most of the methodologies developed emphasis on the 
9 
 
indexing technique for process route evaluation, which is mainly based on the 
reaction parameters. Lawrence [13] has first published his work which entitled 
“Quantifying inherent safety of chemical process route” as his doctoral thesis. In this 
thesis, a prototype index was presented to rank alternative chemical routes based on 
inherent safety characteristics of the alternatives. The prototype index is inclusive 
seven parameters which concerns on the physical properties of chemicals and 
condition of reaction steps. Every route is assessed against the process score using a 
scoring table, which evaluates the temperature, pressure, reaction yield, inventory, 
toxicity, explosiveness and flammability. In this prototype index, it has been tested 
using a number of routes to produce methyl methacrylate (MMA). The prototype 
index also was verified and improved by a panel of experts who ranked the 
alternative routes. According to Lawrence [13], the experts’ judgment and 
experience of inherent safety were needed in order to help to make comments and 
also for improvement of the index. Questionnaires were given to the experts and 
were asked to rank the process route accordingly among themselves. The rankings 
resulted from the experts corresponding closely to the ranking from the calculated 
prototype index.  
 There is also another methodology for quantification of inherent safety level 
proposed by Heikkilä [14] which introduced weighting factors such as pressure, 
temperature, composition, etc. of the chemical process route and can be adjusted 








Table 2: Inherent safety sub-indices (ISI) [14] 
Chemical inherent safety index, 
ICI 
Symbol Score 
Heat of main reaction IRM 0 to 4 
Heat of side reaction, max IRS 0 to 4 
Chemical interaction IINT 0 to 4 
Flammability IFL 0 to 4 
Explosiveness IEX 0 to 4 
Toxic exposure ITOX 0 to 6 
Corrosiveness ICOR 0 to 2 
 
Process inherent safety index, IPI 
  
Inventory II 0 to 5 
Process temperature IT 0 to 4 
Process pressure IP 0 to 4 
Equipment safety  IEQ  
ISBL – Inside Battery Limits   0 to 4 
OSBL – Outside Battery Limits  0 to 3 
Safety of process structure IST 0 to 5 
 
Based on the score ranges resulted from the experts’ evaluation in Table 2, it can be 
related with the expected impact of the parameter to the plant safety. Heikkilä [14] 
concluded that a wider score range for instance, 0 to 6 for toxicity and 0 to 5 for 
inventory which 6 and 5 are the maximum scores means that it has the most 
significant to the inherent safety. The scores for each parameter are mainly obtained 
from the previous researches and/or organizations. Referring to the Table 3, the 
flammability classifications are based on European Union Directive [14], whereas for 
explosiveness in Table 4, it is already specific to be subjectively assigned based on 






Table 3: Flammability sub-index, IFL [14] 
Flammability classification Score of IFL 
Non-flammable 0 
Combustible (flash point > 55°C) 1 
Flammable (flash point < 55°C) 2 
Easily flammable (flash point < 21°C) 3 
Very flammable (flash point < 0°C and boiling point < 35°C) 4 
 
Table 4: Explosiveness sub-index, IEX [14] 
Difference in UEL – LEL (%) Score of IEX 
Non-explosive 0 
0 – 20  1 
20 – 45  2 
45 – 70  3 
70 – 100  4 
 
 Palaniappan et al. [15] however improved Heikkilä’s index systems by 
introducing supplementary indices which are worst chemical index (WCI), worst 
reaction index (WRI) and total chemical index (TCI). These supplementary indices 
were done with regards to a situation where the chemical route contains a highly 
toxic chemical and highly flammable chemical and this may causes complication 
when only one of them is being taken into account. This causes underestimated 
hazard of the process since both of the chemical may causes severity to the plant and 
surrounding. Therefore, WCI was proposed as it is the summation of maximum 
values of flammability, toxicity, reactivity and explosiveness of all materials 
involved in the reaction step. In the same way, WRI is calculated as the sum of the 
maximum of the individual indices of temperature, pressure, yield and heat of 
reaction of all of the reactions involved in the process. The TCI is the amount of 
hazardous chemicals involved in the route. And so, single route with one highly toxic 
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chemical is safer compared to route contains several toxic chemicals. TCI is also 
summation of the ICI of all of the chemicals contributed in the process route. The 
inherent safety index components (Table 5) involved are the individual and overall 
chemical index, individual and overall reaction index, hazardous chemical and 
reaction index, overall safety index and supplementary indices for each process route. 
The component of inherent safety index was carried out by evaluating four routes to 
produce acetic acid shown in Table 6.  
Table 5: Inherent safety index equations [15] 
Component of inherent safety index Notation Equations 
Individual reaction index IRI Rt + Rp + Ry + Rh 
Individual chemical index ICI Nr + Nf + Nt + Ne 
Hazardous chemical index HCI max(ICI) 
Hazardous reaction index HRI max(IRI) 
Overall chemical index OCI max(ICI) 
Overall reaction index ORI ∑IRI 
Overall safety index OSI ∑(OCI + ORI) 
Worst chemical index WCI max(Nr) + max(Nf) + max(Nt) + max(Ne) 
Worst reaction index WRI max(Rt) + max(Rp) + max(Ry) + max(Rh) 











Table 6: Index calculation using Acetic Acid Process Routes [15] 




methane + oxygen → 
methanol + carbon 
monoxide + water 
9 7 10 9 17 14 31 12 9 32 
step 2: 
methanol + carbon 
monoxide → 
acetic acid 
5 10         
Halcon vapor-
phase oxidation 
ethylene + oxygen → 
acetic acid 




oxygen → acetic acid 
6 12 12 6 12 6 18 13 6 20 
Low-pressure 
carbonylation 
methanol + carbon 
monoxide → 
acetic acid 
7 10 10 7 10 7 17 12 7 25 
 
 Later, there was another new development has been done by Gupta and 
Edwards [16] which is a graphical method for measuring inherent safety level. The 
inherently safer design (ISD) measurement procedure suggested by them can be 
applied to differentiate between two or more processes for the same end product, 
which is in their paper focusing on to produce methyl methacrylic acid (MMA) (The 
details of MMA routes is in Appendix A). The procedure is considering each of the 
main parameters affecting the safety (e.g., temperature, pressure, toxicity, 
flammability, etc.) and the possible range values of all the parameters can manage for 
these process routes that included in the consideration for an end product.  Next, 
these values are plotted for every step in every process route and being compared. 
Referring to Figure 2 below, the example used is to compare six routes to produce 
MMA, and based on pressure perspective, the acetone cyanohydrin (ACH) route has 
a major advantage over the other five routes as this route operates at much lower 




Figure 2: Graphical ISL quantification method [16] 
 
 Two years later, in 2005, a new index-approach has been proposed by Khan 
and Amyotte [17] that is a structured guide word-based similar to HAZOP technique 
known as “integrated inherent safety index” (I2SI). The developed index was aimed 
to be applied throughout the life cycle of process design such as the cost model and 
system design model (Figure 3). The I2SI encompasses two main sub-indices which 
are hazard index (HI) and inherent safety potential index (ISPI). The HI is designed 
to measure the damage potential of the process after considering the process and 
hazard control measures. The ISPI is responsible for the applicability of the inherent 




Figure 3: I2SI conceptual framework [17] 
The HI is intended for the base process (any one process option or process setting 
will be considered as the base operation or setting) and maintain the same for all 
other possible options. For each option of HI and ISPI are merged to produce a value 




 Eq. 2.1 
Both HI and ISPI are range from 1 to 200, where the range has been fixed 
considering the maximum and minimum likely values of the impacting parameters. 
This range has shown enough flexibility to quantify the index.  As the result, an I2SI 
has a greater value than unity denotes a positive response of the inherent safety 
guideword application (inherently safer option). The higher the value of I2SI, the 
more pronounced the impact of inherent safety.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Three-Tier Inherent Safety Quantification (3-TISQ) 
 This new technique of Three-Tier Inherent Safety Quantification (3-TISQ) 
implements the concept of inherent safety indices (ISI) and combining it with 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) which could evaluate the inherent safety level 
(ISL) at preliminary design stage. Therefore, a framework has been introduced which 
is able to differentiate ISL of the process routes and followed by the risk assessment 
for process streams within a process route for toxic release accidents. This 
framework is an improvement of the Two-Tier Inherent Safety Index (2-TISI) 
proposed by Leong and Shariff [18]. However, 2-TISI is developed for the case of 
explosion and never focused on prevention or minimization of major accidents due to 
toxic release accidents. Hence, for toxic release accidents, 3-TISQ has the similar 
approach as 2-TISI but with three levels of quantification, i.e. the Toxic Release 
Route Index (TRRI), Toxic Release Stream Index (TRSI) and Toxic Release Inherent 
Risk Assessment (TRIRA). The 3-TISQ framework procedure is as shown in Figure 
4.  
 
Figure 4: 3- TISQ Framework 
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3.1.1 Toxic Release Route Index (TRRI) 
 Practically, the development of Inherent Safety Indices (ISI) is complicated. 
The inherent safety concept at preliminary design stage identifies that safety should 
be deliberated and given high attention and priority when selecting the chemical 
process route. As stated by Edwards and Lawrence [19], the chemical process route, 
or just ‘route’, may be defined as the raw material(s) and the sequence of reactions 
which converts to the desired products.  
 Toxic Release Route Index (TRRI) embraces the similar technique as Process 
Route Index (PRI) but TRRI is focusing on toxic release whereas PRI is to assess 
process route proposed by Leong and Shariff [18] which is for explosion only. TRRI 
uses representative numerical to present ISL for a process route as the first tier in 3-
TISQ. An overall process route index is based on the average value of the relevant 
parameters that influence the toxic release which is also dimensionless is given in 
Equation 3.1. The empirical constant, A0 functions to reduce or increase the 
magnitude of the resulting numbers in the calculation of TRRI and the magnitude is 
up to the acceptable level of the end users.  
𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐼 =  [(𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) × (𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒) × (𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙(𝑇𝐿))] × 𝐴0       
Eq. 3.1 
 All the process parameters can be gained from process design simulator. The 
relative ranking for the index is similar to the technique by Leong and Shariff [18] to 
determine the inherently safer route. Therefore, a larger TRRI value indicates that the 
route is inherently less safe from the toxicity perspective compared to a route having 
smaller TRRI value. 
3.1.2 Toxic Release Stream Index (TRSI) 
 TRSI is developed using similar approach as Shariff et al. [20] by rank the 
streams based on the ISL as the second tier in 3-TISQ. TRSI is a single numerical 
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value to present the ISL in term of relative ranking which also adopts the similar 
theoretical technique from TRRI.  
                                        𝑇𝑅𝑆𝐼 = (𝐼𝑃 × 𝐼𝜌 × 𝐼𝑇𝐿) × 𝐴0                                      Eq. 3.2 
                                   𝐼𝑃 =  
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠
                              Eq. 3.3 
                                  𝐼𝜌 =  
𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠
                                 Eq. 3.4 
                                 𝐼𝑇𝐿 =  
𝑇𝐿 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝐿 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠
                                       Eq. 3.5 
 The worst stream is given by the highest ISL value which can be considered 
as the priority stream to be improved using the inherent principles. Therefore, to 
determine whether the developed TRSI technique can be used to assess and prioritize 
the process streams for the toxic release cases, it has been compared with PSI 
proposed by Shariff et al. [20]. For this index, Acrylic Acid Plant is used as a case 
study and the results shown in Figure 5. By using PEARSON function to calculate 
correlation coefficient, the trending and correlation between both methods can be 
evaluated.  
 
Figure 5: Inherent safety indices for Acrylic Acid streams 
Correlation coefficient, R that is greater than 
0.8 is described as strong, while less than 0.5 
described as weak 
R = 0.98 
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3.1.3 Toxic Release Inherent Risk Assessment (TRIRA) 
 Shariff and Zaini [21] have introduced Toxic Release Inherent Risk 
Assessment (TRIRA) to determine the inherent risk of toxic release hazard by using 
the two-region risk matrix as the third-tier in 3-TISQ as given in Figure 6. The 
framework for inherent risk assessment and also design improvement for the toxic 
release case is shown in Figure 7.  
 The two-region risk matrix is introduced in TRIRA due to the absent of safety 
measures and control mechanisms during preliminary design stage in reducing the 
risk As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Several criteria has been 
compared between TRIRA technique and QRA in Table 7.The information existing 
at preliminary design stage will be useful to evaluate the inherent risk of toxic release 
based on the process conditions of the materials in the process plant.  
 
















Table 7: Comparison between QRA and TRIRA [21] 
Criteria QRA TRIRA 
Stage to be applied Coarse (preliminary) QRA during 
Front End Engineering Design 




Purpose To measure risk for credible major 
accident events and benchmark 
To proactively identify risk, 
inherent to the design intention 
based on the developed risk matrix 
and manage the risk by adopting 
inherent safety principles 
Regulatory 
requirements 
Required by regulatory agencies, 
for example Department of 
Occupational Safety & Health in 
Malaysia and the Health and Safety 
Executive in the UK 
No regulatory requirement 
Information 
required 
Process & instrumentation 
diagrams (P&ID), process 
conditions, reliability data and 
historical weather data 
Simulation data on process 
conditions, approximate reliability 
data, piping and equipment sizing 
Scenario  Only few credible scenario 
including worst case to be studied 
in detail  
Worst case scenario 
Duration of 
analysis 
Relatively long depending on the 
size of the plant 
Relatively quick as it is carried out 
in parallel with simulation work 
Result 
representation 
3-region Frequency-Number (F-N) 
curve covering tolerable, tolerable 
with ALARP and intolerable 
regions 
2-region risk matrix covering 










3.2 Key Milestone  
Table 8 shows the key milestone throughout the project.  
Table 8: Key Milestone 
Semester Task Completion 
May 2014 
Selection of Project Topic Week 2 
Preliminary research work Week 5 
Submission of extended proposal Week 6 
Proposal Defense Week 8 
Submission of Interim Draft Report Week 13 
Submission of Interim Draft Report Week 14 
September 2014 
Submission of Progress Report Week 8 
Pre-SEDEX Week 11 
Submission of Draft Report Week 12 
Submission of Dissertation (soft bound) Week 13 
Submission of Technical Paper Week 13 
Oral presentation Week 14 














3.3 Gantt-Chart  
Table 9 shows the Gantt chart for FYP 1. 


















































































First meeting with coordinator 
and supervisor 
              
Problem statement and analysis 
of project 
              
Preliminary research work and 
literature review 
              
Submission of extended 
proposal defense 
              
Oral proposal defense 
presentation 
              
Preparation of Interim Report               
Submission of Interim Draft 
Report 
              
Submission of Interim Final 
Report 
              




Table 10 shows the Gantt chart for FYP 2. 
























































































Project work continues                
Submission of Progress Report                
Project work continues                
Pre-SEDEX                
Submission of Draft Report                
Submission of Dissertation (soft 
bound) 
               
Submission of Technical Paper                
Oral presentation                
Submission of Project 
Dissertation (hard bound) 
               




CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Overview 
 In this chapter, a case study will demonstrate the application of the Three-Tier 
Inherent Safety Quantification (3-TISQ) for designing an inherently safer process 
plant. It is concluded that 3-TISQ has the potential to assist design engineers to 
measure the potential risks during the preliminary design stage. Besides, it can also 
provide preliminary toxic release consequence analyses. Therefore, with all the 
knowledge available to the design engineers, they can choose for potential inherently 
safer design for the process plant.  
4.2 Case Study: Application of 3-TISQ to quantify the inherent safety level (ISL) 
 The recent case study is based on acrylic acid via propylene oxidation process 
simulation by Shariff et. al. [22]. It is designed to demonstrate the application of 3-
TISQ for quantifying the inherent safety level (ISL) which the main target is on toxic 
release at preliminary design stage. Briefly, acrylic acid is commonly produced by 
partial oxidation of propylene. In this route, the typical mechanism for producing 
acrylic acid has two-step process in which propylene is first oxidized to acrolein and 
then further oxidized to acrylic acid [23].  
 Referring to Figure 8, propylene is partially oxidized to acrolein in CRV101 
and further converted in CRV 102 to become acrylic acid. During the process, the 
gaseous product from CRV102 is partly quenched and passed through A101, the 
scrubber tower. Next, the liquid stream from the A101’s bottom is combined with the 
liquid stream from the V101 and passed to two distillation columns in series for 
purification. For the last step, T101 is responsible to separate water from the mixture 
of water and acrylic acid in stream 23 and achieved 99.6% purity. In this preliminary 
design, T102 is added for further acrylic acid purification from 99.6% to 99.9% by a 
distillation process.  
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 From this process simulation, analysis has been done by applying the first tier 
of 3-TISQ and the Toxic Release Route Index (TRRI) overall index calculated is 
1.73. In order to prioritize the stream, identify the ‘worst’ stream and list down the 
streams that have low or hazardless by using the second tier of 3-TISQ which is 
Toxic Release Stream Index (TRSI) to rank the process streams within the process 
route. From Table 11, the TRSI calculation shows that stream 18 has the highest 
score amongst the process streams in the simulation followed by stream 23 and 26 
respectively. This indicates that stream 18 is the most hazardous if toxic release 
occurs.  
Table 11: Inherent safety indices for Acrylic Acid streams 
Acrylic Acid Stream 
[24] 
Process Stream Index (PSI) 
[20] 
 Toxic Release Stream 
Index (TRSI) 
Calculated index value Calculated index value 
1 0.11 0.09 
2 0.00 0.00 
3 0.00 0.00 
4 0.00 0.00 
5 0.08 0.07 
6 0.00 0.00 
7 0.08 0.03 
8 0.05 0.02 
9 0.00 0.00 
10 0.12 0.06 
11 0.00 0.00 
12 0.12 0.06 
13 0.13 0.07 
14 0.04 0.13 
15 0.00 0.00 
16 0.09 0.32 
17 0.00 0.01 
18 13.54 56.42 
19 0.00 0.00 
20 0.00 0.00 
21 0.00 2.22 
22 0.00 0.17 
23 12.52 38.39 
24 0.00 0.00 
25 0.10 1.31 
26 1.16 15.27 
27 0.20 2.68 









































































































 Followed by the third tier of 3-TISQ which is Toxic Release Inherent Risk 
Assessment (TRIRA), it has been carried out to evaluate the risk that is inherent to 
the process conditions and composition using i-TORSET (Figure 9) for the severity. 
i-TORSET severity estimation for stream 18 was calculated in the Appendix B while 
the probability of toxic release is calculated using i-TORFAT (Figure 10). i-
TORFAT is a fault tree analysis (FTA) which is a simplified basis to describe a 
likelihood toxic release event developed by Khan and Abbasi [25] and Khan et. al. 
[26]. Once the probability of the top event has been determined, it can be used to 
assess the likelihood of occurrence. The likelihood of occurrence was developed 
based on MIL-STD-882D standard [27]. The summary of the Acute Exposure 
Guideline Level (AEGL) value for acrylic acid is given in Table 12. From the 
calculated severity in Appendix B and probability, the results were combined on a 
two-region risk matrix (Figure 11). The background of the risk matrix was explained 
in section 3.1.3. From Figure 11, it can be concluded that the inherent risk of the 
stream 18 is in the ACCEPTABLE region.  
 
Figure 9: Severity estimation for stream 18 rupture occurrence (i-TORSET) 
Input Data Result
Composition Acrylic Acid
Total Release Q*m 5.11 kg Stability Class F
Molecular Weight MW 72.06 Assumed wind speed, m: 2 m/s
Temperature T 298 kg Dispersion Coefficients:
Pressure P 1 atm Sigma y: σy 11 m
Release Height H 0 m Sigma z: σz 3.8 m
Distance Downwind x 1200 m Downwind concentration: C 0.001419 kg/m^3
Distance Off Wind y 0 m 1418.757 mg/m^3
Distance Above Ground z 0 m PPM: 481.4614 ppm
The time required for the center to arrive 10 min
Probit -4.7








Figure 10: i-TORFAT likelihood estimation for stream 18 rupture occurrence [25] & 
[26] 
Table 12: Likelihood ratings [27] 
Likelihood of occurrence Likelihood of event occurring/year 
Very high 10
-0
 ≥ P 10-1 
High 10
-1
 ≥ P 10-2 
Moderate 10
-2
 ≥ P 10-3 
Low 10
-3
 ≥ P 10-4 
Very low 10
-4
 ≥ P 10-5 
Unlikely 10
-5
 ≥ P 10-6 
 
Table 13: Acute Exposure Guideline Level (AEGL) value for acrylic acid 
Chemical name: Acrylic Acid (in ppm) 
 10 min 30 min 60 min 4 hr 8 hr 
AEGL-1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
AEGL-2 68 68 46 21 14 
AEGL-3 480 260 180 85 58 
 


























Very High [1] A1 B1 C1
Likelihood of 
Occurrence (year-1)
Severity of Occurrence 
AEGL – 1 [A]
(ppm)
AEGL – 2 [B]
(ppm)
AEGL – 3 [C]
(ppm)
B5
High [2] A2 B2 C2
Moderate [3] A3 B3 C3
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION  
 The growth of chemical, oil and gas industries since 1960s has seen an 
increasing number of major accidents where it now comprises complex processes to 
achieve desired products. Some of examples of previous major accidents which gave 
historic impact to human has triggered the engineers to be more serious and aware 
about safety in the process industries, were discussed in section 1.1. A few general 
safety and hazard assessments tools used in industries were briefly described in 
section 2.2. Although implementing these techniques to yield the best results during 
the early stage, however, these techniques are not suitable to apply at preliminary 
design stage due to unavailability of required data. 
 Thus, the 3-TISQ is developed to allow design engineers to integrate inherent 
safety indices with inherent risk assessment for implementing the inherent safety 
features efficiently and cost efficient. 3-TISQ has three levels of quantification which 
are Toxic Release Route Index (TRRI), Toxic Release Stream Index (TRSI) and 
Toxic Release Inherent Risk Assessment (TRIRA). The TRRI was compared against 
previous research which is Process Route Index (PRI) by Leong and Shariff [18] and 
produces good results which are in-line with PRI since TRRI and PRI have the 
ability to quantify properties of the mixture in a route. Followed by TRSI, also was 
compared against the Process Stream Index (PSI) developed by Shariff et. al. [20] 
and produces results that are in good agreement with PSI since TRSI and PSI have 
the ability to measure the properties of the mixture in a stream. Furthermore, TRIRA 
is added as the third tier in this framework to be used as an integrated tool during 
process simulation to apply the principles of inherent safety. 3-TISQ also has been 
tested to acrylic acid plant as the case study to proof the capability of this new 
framework to quantify consequence of toxic release.  
 For the next improvement, 3-TISQ has the potential to determine the 
consequence analysis for other type of hazard since the present work only presented 
the consequences and risk assessment for toxic release. Due to this, it is 
recommended to propose a complete development of this model for other hazards 
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and integrate them using two-region risk matrix inherent risk assessment. Besides, in 
the future, cost analysis can be include which can calculate the potential risks 
associated with the cost especially risk in the operation of the process plant, risk to 
environment, risk to assets and equipment and risk to financial performance. By 
integrating some additional data and enhancements the methodology, 3-TISQ is 
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Appendix A: Details of six MMA routes [16] 
Route 1: Acetone cyanohydrin based route (ACH) 
Step 1: 2CH4 + 2NH3 + 3O2 → 2HCN + 6H2 O 
Methane + ammonia + oxygen → hydrogen cyanide + water Gas phase, 
pressure: 3.4 atm, temperature: 1200 ◦C, yield: 64% 
Step 2: (CH3)2 CO + HCN → (CH3)2 COHCN 
Acetone + hydrogen cyanide → acetone cyanohydrin 
Liquid phase, pressure: atm, temperature: 29–38 ◦C, yield: 91% 
Step 3: 2(CH3)2 COHCN + H2SO4 + 2H2 O → (CH3)2 COHCONH2 + (CH3)2 COHCONH2 · H2 SO4 
Heat 
−→ CH2  C(CH3)CONH2 + CH2  C(CH3)CONH2 · H2 SO4 + 2H2 O 
Acetone cyanohydrin + sulphuric acid + water 
→ 2-hydroxyl-2-methyl propionamide + 2-hydroxyl-2-methyl propionamide sulphate 
→ methacrylamide + methacrylamide sulphate + water 
Liquid phase, pressure: 7 atm, temperature: 130–150 ◦C, yield: 98% 
Step 4: CH2 =C(CH3)CONH2 + CH2 =C(CH3)CONH2 · H2 SO4 + 2CH3OH + H2 SO4 → 
2CH2 =C(CH3)COOCH3 + 2NH4HSO4 
Methacrylamide + methacrylamide sulphate + methanol + sulphuric acid → MMA + ammonium bisulphate Liquid phase, 
pressure: 7 atm, temperature: 110–130 ◦C, yield: 100% 
Step 5: H2 SO4 + 2NH4HSO4 + 3O2 + CH4 → 3SO2 + CO2 + N2 + 8H2 O + O2 
Sulphuric acid + ammonium bisulphate + oxygen + methane 
→ sulphur dioxide + carbon dioxide + nitrogen + water + oxygen Gas phase, pressure: 
atm, temperature: 980–1200 ◦C, yield: 100% 
Step 6: 2SO2 + O2 → 2SO3 
Sulphur dioxide + oxygen → sulphur trioxide 
Gas phase, pressure: atm, temperature: 405–440 ◦C, yield: 99.7% 
 
Route 2: Ethylene (via methyl propionate) based route (C2/MP) 
 
Step 1: CH2 =CH2 + CO + CH3OH → CH3CH2 COOCH3 
Ethylene + carbon monoxide + methanol → methyl propionate Liquid phase, 
pressure: 100 atm, temperature: 100 ◦C, yield: 89% 
Step 2: 6CH3OH + O2 → 2CH3OCH2 OCH3 + 4H2 O 
Methanol + oxygen → methylal + water 
Vapour phase, pressure: ?, temperature: ?, yield: ? 
Step 3: CH3CH2 COOCH3 + CH3OCH2 OCH3 → CH2 =C(CH3)COOCH3 + 2CH3OH 
                Methyl propionate + methylal → MMA + methanol Liquid  
          phase, pressure: ?, temperature: 350 ◦C, yield: 87.4% 
 
Route 3: Ethylene (via propionaldehyde) based route (C2/PA) 
 
Step 1: CH2 =CH2 + CO + H2 → CH3CH2 CHO 
Ethylene + carbon monoxide + hydrogen → propionaldehyde Gas phase, 
pressure: 15 atm, temperature: 30 ◦C, yield: 90.7% 
Step 2: CH3CH2 CHO + CH2 O → CH2=C(CH3)CHO + H2 O 
Propionaldehyde + formaldehyde → methacrolein + water 
Liquid phase, pressure: 49 atm, temperature: 160–185 ◦C, yield: 98.2% 
Step 3: 2CH2 =C(CH3)CHO + O2 → 2CH2 =C(CH3)COOH 
Methacrolein + oxygen → methacrylic acid 
Gas phase, pressure: 350 atm, temperature: ?, yield: 57.75% 
 
        Step 4: CH2 =C(CH3)COOH + CH3OH → CH2 =C(CH3)COOCH3 + H2 O 
        Methacrylic acid + methanol → MMA + water 
       Liquid phase, pressure: 6.8–7.5 atm, temperature: 70–100 ◦C, yield: 75% 
 




Step 1: CH3CHCH2 + CO + HF → (CH3)2 CHCOF 
Propylene + carbon monoxide + hydrogen fluoride → isobutyrl fluoride Liquid phase, 
pressure: 90–100 atm, temperature: 70 ◦C, yield: 94.5% 
Step 2: (CH3)2CHCOF + H2 O → (CH3)2 CHCOOH + HF 
Isobutyrl fluoride + water → isobutyric acid + hydrogen fluoride Liquid phase, 
pressure: 10 atm, temperature: 40–90 ◦C, yield: 96.2% 
Step 3: 2(CH3)2 CHCOOH + O2 → 2CH2 =C(CH3)COOH + 2H2O 
Isobutyric acid + oxygen → methacylic acid + water 
Vapour phase, pressure: 2.5–3 atm, temperature: 320–354 ◦C, yield: 70.5% 
Step 4: CH2 =C(CH3)COOH + CH3OH → CH2 =C(CH3)COOCH3 + H2 O 
Methacrylic acid + methanol → MMA + water 
Liquid phase, pressure: 6.8–7.5 atm, temperature: 70–100 ◦C, yield: 75% 
 
Route 5: Isobutylene based route (i-C4) 
 
Step 1: (CH3)2CCH2 + O2 → CH2 CCH3CHO + H2 O 
Isobutylene + oxygen → methacrolein + water 
Vapour phase, pressure: ?, temperature: 395 ◦C, yield: 41.8% 
Step 2: 2CH2 CCH3CHO + O2 → 2CH2 CCH3COOH 
Methacrolein + oxygen → methacrylic acid 
Vapour phase, pressure: 3.7 atm, temperature: 350 ◦C, yield: 57.75% 
Step 3: CH2 =C(CH3)COOH + CH3OH → CH2 =C(CH3)COOCH3 + H2 O 
Methacrylic acid + methanol → MMA + water 
Liquid phase, pressure: 6.8–7.5 atm, temperature: 70–100 ◦C, yield: 75% 
 
Route 6: Tertiary butyl alcohol based route (TBA) 
 
Step 1: (CH3)3COH + O2 → CH2 CCH3CHO + 2H2O 
Tertiary butyl alcohol + oxygen → methacrolein + water Vapour phase, 
pressure: 4.8 atm, temperature: 350 ◦C, yield: 83% 
Step 2: 2CH2 CCH3CHO + O2 → 2CH2 CCH3COOH 
Methacrolein + oxygen → methacrylic acid 
Vapour phase, pressure: 3.7 atm, temperature: 350 ◦C, yield: 57.75% 
Step 3: CH2 =C(CH3)COOH + CH3OH → CH2 =C(CH3)COOCH3 + H2 O 
Methacrylic acid + methanol → MMA + water 
Liquid phase, pressure: 6.8–7.5 atm, temperature: 70–100 ◦C 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________























ESTIMATION OF RELEASE, DISPERSION AND TOXIC EFFECT CRITERIA 















Appendix B: Estimation of Release, Dispersion and Toxic Effect Criteria from 
stream 18 Acrylic Acid Simulation 
Calculation:  
1) Discharge rate of acrylic acid through a rupture of 100 mm pipeline 
diameter at T = 65
o
C and P1 = 200 kPa 
Data:  
Diameter of the pipe, 100 mm = 0.1 m, A = 0.007855 m
2
 
Acrylic acid heat capacity ratio, k = 1.17 
Discharge coefficient, CD = 1 
Ideal gas constant, Rg = 8314 Pa.m
3
 / kg-mole.K 
Molecular weight of propane, M = 72.06 kg / kg-mole 
Gravitational constant, gc = 1 
 















a) The worst case scenario is assumed to originate from 100 mm diameter 
pipeline rupture since there is an uncertainties arise due to an incomplete 
understanding or the availability of the geometry of the release, that is the 
hole size. [28] 





By using equation stated in [1] to calculate downwind concentration: 




















*    
= 5.11 kg 
Sigma y, 𝜎𝑦     = 11 m 
Sigma z, 𝜎𝑧     = 3.8 m 
Distance downwind, x   = 1200 m 
Distance off wind, y    = 0 m 
Distance above ground, z   = 0m 
Time since the release of puff cloud, t = 10 minutes 
Downwind concentration center at 1200 m from source release = 481.4614 ppm 
Assumption:  
a) The release is assumed to disperse at ground level, coordinates fixed at 
release point, constant wind only in x direction, constant wind velocity u with 
maximum concentration occurring at the centre of the puff cloud (x = ut, y = 
0, z = 0 in equation above) and 𝜎𝑥 = 𝜎𝑦 [1] 
b) The wind class stability F at the distance of x = ut = 1200 m with u = 2 m/s 
wind speed. This is the distance for the 10 minutes duration of the accidental 
released in the case of the worst condition [28] 
c) The mass of material release is calculated at the instant the rupture occurs, 
with the discharge rate decreasing as a function of time as the pressure within 






3) Toxic Effect Criteria Calculation  
From Table 4.2, the AEGL value for Acrylic acid is AEGL-3 by referring the value 
481.4614 ppm from downwind concentration calculation.  
Probit function in a term of describing the fatalities by toxic release is calculated 
using equation below  
𝑃𝑟 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 ln(𝑐
𝑛𝑡) 
For acrylic acid, 
A = -27.3, B = 1.7 and n = 1.8 according to 
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/pubs/tsd304.pdf 
 
From the equation stated above, probit calculation for acrylic acid at 1200 m = -4.7  
 
For spreadsheet computations, equation below is used to get the percent of fatalities: 
 








After calculation, the percent of fatalities for acrylic acid at 1200 m = 0% 
 
